Henry Kissinger: To settle the Ukraine crisis, start
 
at the end
By Henry A. Kissinger

March 5, 2014

Henry A. Kissinger was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977.

Public discussion on Ukraine is all about confrontation. But do we know where we are going? In my
life, I have seen four wars begun with great enthusiasm and public support, all
of which we did not know how to end and from three of which we withdrew
unilaterally. The test of policy is how it ends, not how it begins.

Far too often the Ukrainian issue is posed as a showdown: whether Ukraine joins the East or the
West. But if Ukraine is to survive and thrive, it must not be either side’s
outpost against the other — it should function as a bridge between them.

Russia must accept that to try to force Ukraine into a satellite status, and thereby move Russia’s
borders again, would doom Moscow to repeat its history of self-fulfilling
cycles of reciprocal pressures with Europe and the United States.

The West must understand that, to Russia, Ukraine can never be just a foreign
country. Russian history began in what was called Kievan-Rus. The Russian
religion spread from there. Ukraine has been part of Russia for centuries, and
their histories were intertwined before then. Some of the most important
battles for Russian freedom, starting with the Battle of
Poltava in 1709 , were fought on Ukrainian soil. The Black Sea
Fleet — Russia’s means of projecting power in the Mediterranean — is based by
long-term lease in Sevastopol, in Crimea. Even such famed dissidents as
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Joseph Brodsky insisted that Ukraine was an integral
part of Russian history and, indeed, of Russia.

The European Union must recognize that its bureaucratic dilatoriness and subordination of the strategic
element to domestic politics in negotiating Ukraine’s relationship to Europe

contributed to turning a negotiation into a crisis. Foreign policy is the art
of establishing priorities.
The Ukrainians are the decisive element. They live in a country with a complex history
and a polyglot composition. The Western part was incorporated into the Soviet
Union in 1939 , when Stalin and Hitler divided up the spoils.
Crimea, 60 percent of whose population is Russian , became part of Ukraine only in 1954 ,
when Nikita Khrushchev, a Ukrainian by birth, awarded it as part of the
300th-year celebration of a Russian agreement with the Cossacks. The west is
largely Catholic; the east largely Russian Orthodox. The west speaks Ukrainian;
the east speaks mostly Russian. Any attempt by one wing of Ukraine to dominate
the other — as has been the pattern — would lead eventually to civil war or
break up. To treat Ukraine as part of an East-West confrontation would
scuttle for decades any prospect to bring Russia and the West — especially
Russia and Europe — into a cooperative international system.

Ukraine has been independent for only 23 years; it had previously been under some kind
of foreign rule since the 14th century. Not surprisingly, its
leaders have not learned the art of compromise, even less of historical
perspective. The politics of post-independence Ukraine clearly demonstrates
that the root of the problem lies in efforts by Ukrainian politicians to impose
their will on recalcitrant parts of the country, first by one faction, then by
the other. That is the essence of the conflict between Viktor Yanu­kovych and
his principal political rival, Yulia Tymo­shenko. They represent the two wings
of Ukraine and have not been willing to share power. A wise U.S. policy toward
Ukraine would seek a way for the two parts of the country to cooperate with
each other. We should seek reconciliation, not the domination of a faction.

Russia and the West, and least of all the various factions in Ukraine, have not acted on this principle. Each
has made the situation worse. Russia would not be able to impose a military
solution without isolating itself at a time when many of its borders are
already precarious. For the West, the demonization of Vladimir Putin is not a policy;
it is an alibi for the absence of one.

Putin should come to realize that, whatever his grievances, a policy of military impositions would produce
another Cold War. For its part, the United States needs to avoid treating
Russia as an aberrant to be patiently taught rules of conduct established by
Washington. Putin is a serious strategist — on the premises of Russian history.
Understanding U.S. values and psychology are not his strong suits. Nor has
understanding Russian history and psychology been a strong point of U.S.
policymakers.

Leaders of all sides should return to examining outcomes, not compete in posturing. Here is my notion of an
outcome compatible with the values and security interests of all sides:

1. Ukraine should have the right to choose freely its economic and political associations, including with
Europe.

2. Ukraine should not join NATO, a position I took seven years ago, when it last came up.

3. Ukraine should be free to create any government compatible with the expressed will of its people.
Wise Ukrainian leaders would then opt for a policy of reconciliation between
the various parts of their country. Internationally, they should pursue a posture
comparable to that of Finland. That nation leaves no doubt about its fierce
independence and cooperates with the West in most fields but carefully avoids
institutional hostility toward Russia.

4. It is incompatible with the rules of the existing world order for Russia to annex Crimea. But it
should be possible to put Crimea’s relationship to Ukraine on a less fraught
basis. To that end, Russia would recognize Ukraine’s sovereignty over Crimea.
Ukraine should reinforce Crimea’s autonomy in elections held in the presence of
international observers. The process would include removing any ambiguities
about the status of the Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol.

These are principles, not prescriptions. People familiar with the region will know that not all of
them will be palatable to all parties. The test is not absolute satisfaction
but balanced dissatisfaction. If some solution based on these or comparable
elements is not achieved, the drift toward confrontation will accelerate. The
time for that will come soon enough.
 

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