安全視角：當歷史開始押韻歐洲高度警戒時代將臨

班阿米（Shlomo Ben-Ami）《上报》 2024年04月19日
班阿米（Shlomo Ben-Ami）
●以色列前外交部長
●托雷多國際和平中心副總裁

人們經常引用馬克吐溫（Mark Twain）的一句話：「歷史或許不會重演，但常會押韻。」而他或許還會補充說，當歷史真的押韻時，結果往往是災難性的。

正如軸心國（德國、義大利和日本）對領土的野心，為第二次世界大戰埋下伏筆一樣，當前由中國、俄羅斯、伊朗和北韓組成的專制集團，也在試圖瓦解自由的國際秩序。現在一如當年，如果各軍事聯盟自動回應對手的敵對行為，那麼全球各種衝突都可能演變成一場世界大戰。

舉例來說，美國前總統川普很可能在2025年重返白宮。鑑於他對歐洲安全的漠視，自二戰結束後一直依賴美國安全保障的歐洲國家，顯然應該感到擔憂。

但這不僅是川普的問題。考量到中國與日俱增的影響力以及美國隨之調整戰略重點，即使拜登（Joe Biden）再次連任，美國也可能減少對北約的承諾，轉而支持AUKUS，這個由美國、澳洲和英國共同建立軍事同盟，是為了因應中國在印度洋─太平洋地區的威脅。美國對烏克蘭的興趣減弱突顯這一轉變，只留下歐洲去填補由此產生的安全真空。

因此歐洲各國首都開始擔心戰爭一觸即發。波蘭總理圖斯克（Donald Tusk）最近表示歐洲已進入「戰前時期」，而歐盟執委會主席馮德萊恩（Ursula von der Leyen）則警告，歐洲大陸的陸地戰爭「或許不是迫在眉睫，但也並非不可能」。與此同時，法國總統馬克宏（Emmanuel Macron）並未排除向烏克蘭派兵的可能性，英國總參謀長桑德斯（Patrick Sanders）將軍則呼籲要「全國動員」，並表示英國公民必須做好與俄羅斯對抗的準備。

雖然俄羅斯對西班牙和義大利等國的威脅還很遙遠，但大多數歐盟成員國都擔心俄國總統普丁會來到自己家門口，也突顯歐洲欠缺戰略自主權的缺失。麥肯錫公司估計，與1960-1992年間的年均國防支出相比，歐洲國家過去幾十年透過縮減軍隊規模已節省8.6兆美元。歐洲軍事力量主要部署在人道主義和維和任務中，也因此被形容為「盆栽軍隊」，亦即作戰經驗有限的真實軍隊縮小版。

此外，鑑於歐洲的國防工業遠落後於俄羅斯（更不用說美國），歐洲軍力建設可能需要耗費數年。德國聯邦國防軍的全部彈藥儲備，只能夠與俄羅斯這樣的對手作戰兩天，就說明問題的嚴重性。

雖然俄羅斯已不復當年勇，但歐洲有充分的理由感到擔憂。普丁想要扭轉冷戰結果的決心，已演變成一種近乎宗教式的執著要重建俄羅斯帝國的權力。他在2008年揮軍入侵喬治亞、2014年吞併克里米亞以及2022年全面進攻烏克蘭都展現了這種無休止的野心。在普丁統治下，俄羅斯的艦艇和偵察機定期會沿著瑞典、芬蘭、波羅的海國家甚至英國等國的邊境進行偵察。

普丁的侵略行為已迫使歐洲放棄後歷史（post-historical）思維，並開始認真重整軍備。2022年歐盟成員國的軍費開支達到創紀錄的2400億歐元（約2600億美元），比前一年增加6%，據麥肯錫公司預測，到2028 年歐洲的年度國防支出可能增至5000億歐元。

在與烏克蘭激戰兩年中，俄羅斯軍隊在組織和物資上都受損，加上全面動員與北約開戰可能導致政權不穩的風險，很可能會阻止普丁在可預見的將來發動更多軍事行動。如果俄羅斯在烏克蘭的戰果僅限於目前的防線，且無法取得一場決定性勝利（這取決於西方對烏克蘭的支持），那麼普丁在波羅的海地區進一步冒險的欲望將大打折扣。然而，這並不妨礙他試圖破壞摩莫爾多瓦、喬治亞、南高加索、西巴爾幹甚至法國和英國的穩定，也不會限制他的私人軍隊在非洲的行動。

但普丁的核威脅反映出俄羅斯無力在常規軍備競賽中與北約抗衡，北約在1980年代曾重創蘇聯。儘管歐洲國家的國防支出仍低於北約GDP的2%目標，但即使不把美國計算在內，俄羅斯也無法與北約成員國的國防預算總和相提並論。

增加軍費開支可以防止俄羅斯攻擊歐洲國家，但只靠增加國防預算並不能解決歐洲大陸的戰略問題。歐洲還必須整合不同的軍事文化和武器系統，加強互通性，鑑於這是漫長的過程，馮德萊恩提議設立歐盟防務專員是朝正確方向邁出一步。

歐洲還需要減少對美國核保護傘的依賴，建立獨立的歐洲核威懾力量是反擊普丁侵略的關鍵，而這只有法國和英國才能做到。正如《經濟學人》最近所指的，如果沒有這種威懾力量，那麼對於法國發展「軍事和核打擊力量」的理由——也就是美國不會為了巴黎而犧牲紐約——如今歐洲其他國家可能也會問：法國願意為了（愛沙尼亞首都）塔林而犧牲（法國第4大城）土魯斯嗎？

也就是說，即使歐洲提高威懾能力，也不能假定領導人必然會做出理性的決策。歷史學家塔克曼（Barbara Tuchman）在1984年出版的《愚政進行曲：從木馬屠城到越南戰爭》一書中指出，政治領導人的行為往往會違背自身利益。美國在中東的災難性戰爭、蘇聯最終失敗的阿富汗戰爭，以及當前以色列和哈瑪斯在加薩地區的盲目仇恨戰爭（有可能擴大成區域衝突），都是這類錯誤行為的典型例子。正如塔克曼指出的，愚政進行曲永遠不會停止演奏，而這正是歐洲為何必做好準備迎接一個高度警戒的時代。（本篇翻譯由PS官方提供，責任編輯：楊淑華）

© Project Syndicate  
（原標題為：《Europe's War Jitters》
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/europe-must-prepare-for-possibility-of-war-against-russia-by-shlomo-ben-ami-2024-04

Europe’s War JittersApr 12, 2024SHLOMO BEN-AMI
Faced with the looming threat of a Russian victory in Ukraine, Europe must decide how to confront Vladimir Putin’s neo-imperialism. Rather than depending on the United States for protection, the European Union must get serious about rearmament and develop its own nuclear deterrent.

TEL AVIV – Mark Twain is often quoted as saying, “History may not repeat itself, but it often rhymes.” He might have added that when history does rhyme, the results are often disastrous.
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Just as the territorial ambitions of the Axis powers – Germany, Italy, and Japan – set the stage for World War II, the current authoritarian bloc of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea seeks to dismantle the liberal international order. Now, as then, various conflicts around the world could spiral into a worldwide war if military alliances are automatically activated in response to hostile actions by adversaries.

Consider, for example, the very real possibility that former US President Donald Trump will return to the White House in 2025. Given his blithe disregard for Europe’s security, it is clear why European countries, which have relied on the United States for their security since the end of World War II, should be concerned.

But this is not just about Trump. Given China’s growing influence and the subsequent rebalancing of US strategic priorities, even a second Joe Biden term could lead to a reduced American commitment to NATO in favor of AUKUS, the military alliance that he created with Australia and Britain to face China’s threat in the Indo-Pacific. America’s waning interest in Ukraine underscores this shift, with Europe left to fill the resulting security vacuum.

Consequently, fears of an imminent war have seized European capitals. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk recently said that Europe has entered a “pre-war era,” while European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen warned that a land war on the continent “may not be imminent, but it is not impossible.” Meanwhile, French President Emmanuel Macron has not ruled out the possibility of sending troops to Ukraine, and the United Kingdom’s Chief of General Staff, General Patrick Sanders, has called for “national mobilization” and said British citizens must be ready to fight Russia.

While Russia represents a distant threat to countries like Spain and Italy, most EU member states fear that Russian President Vladimir Putin is on their doorstep, highlighting Europe’s lack of strategic autonomy. McKinsey estimates that European countries saved $8.6 trillion over the past few decades, compared to average defense spending from 1960 to 1992, by downsizing their militaries. Mainly deployed in humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, European military forces have been described as “bonsai armies” – miniature versions of real armies, with limited combat experience.

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Moreover, given that Europe’s defense industry lags far behind Russia’s, and even more so the US’, building up Europe’s military capabilities will probably take years. Tellingly, the entire ammunition stockpile of the German Bundeswehr (armed forces) would sustain just two days of combat against an adversary like Russia.

While Russia is not as strong as it once was, Europe has good reasons to be concerned. Putin’s determination to reverse the outcome of the Cold War has escalated into a near-religious obsession with restoring Russian imperial power. His war of aggression in Georgia in 2008, annexation of Crimea in 2014, and full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 illustrate his relentless ambition. Under Putin, Russia’s ships and spy planes regularly survey the borders of countries like Sweden, Finland, the Baltic states, and even the UK.

Putin’s aggression has forced Europe to abandon its post-historical mindset and get serious about rearmament. Military spending by the European Union’s member states reached a record of €240 billion ($260 billion) in 2022, a 6% increase from the previous year, with McKinsey projecting that Europe’s annual defense expenditures could increase to €500 billion by 2028.

The organizational and material degradation Russia’s military has suffered during two years of intense fighting in Ukraine, along with the risk that a full-scale mobilization for war with NATO could destabilize his regime, will likely deter Putin from embarking on additional military campaigns in the foreseeable future. If Russia’s gains in Ukraine are limited to its current defensive lines without a decisive victory – an outcome contingent on Western support for Ukraine – Putin’s appetite for further adventures in the Baltics would be severely diminished. Nevertheless, this would not prevent him from trying to destabilize Moldova, Georgia, the South Caucasus, the Western Balkans, and even France and the UK, nor would it limit the operations of his private military forces in Africa.

But Putin’s nuclear threats reflect Russia’s inability to compete with NATO in a conventional arms race of the kind that crippled the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Even though European countries still spend less on defense than the NATO target of 2% of GDP, Russia cannot match the combined defense budget of NATO’s member states, even without the US.

But while boosting military spending could prevent Russia from attacking European countries, larger defense budgets alone will not solve the continent’s strategic problems. To defend itself, Europe must also improve the integration and interoperability of its various military cultures and weapon systems. Given that this will be a prolonged process, von der Leyen’s proposal to establish an EU Defense Commissioner is a step in the right direction.

Europe also needs to reduce its reliance on the US nuclear umbrella. Establishing an independent European nuclear deterrent, which only France and the UK can provide, is crucial to countering Putin’s aggression. Without such a deterrent, as The Economist recently put it, the same rationale that led France to develop its Force de Frappe (military and nuclear strike force) – the notion that America would not sacrifice New York for Paris – could now extend to the rest of Europe: Would France be willing to risk Toulouse for Tallinn?

That said, even if Europe were to improve its deterrence capabilities, it would be unwise to assume that leaders necessarily make rational decisions. In her 1984 book The March of Folly, historian Barbara Tuchman observes that political leaders frequently act against their own interests. America’s disastrous wars in the Middle East, the Soviet Union’s ill-fated campaign in Afghanistan, and the ongoing war of blind hatred between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, with its potential to escalate into a larger regional conflict, are prime examples of such missteps. As Tuchman notes, the march of folly is never-ending. That is precisely why Europe must prepare itself for an era of heightened vigilance.



贴主:Haisen2023于2024_04_21 5:25:22编辑