【译丛】拯救自由世界秩序，加强中坚力量
Dec 16, 2023
 ——需要制定一项广泛战略以维护和加强自由的、基于规则的全球秩序：该秩序的领导者必须“加强中坚力量”。
作者：迈克尔·米克劳西克，约翰·R·艾伦
译者：白丁
原载：美国《国家利益》杂志2023 年 12 月 12 日  译：https://yibaochina.com/?p=252042

冷战后的世界秩序已经支离破碎，无法恢复。 独裁政权决心取而代之的，是一个有利于威权治理的全球秩序，这种秩序基于普遍的监视、社会和政治控制以及铁腕政权领袖。 现在需要制定一项广泛的战略来维护和加强自由的、基于规则的全球秩序，而该秩序的领导者必须“加强中坚力量”。yibaochina.com

在苏联及其共产主义意识形态解体后的大约二十五年中，民主的资本主义治理模式似乎是最后的生存者，而涉及国家和全球治理的其他模式则遭到质疑和摒弃。yibaochina.com

正当西方国家专注于清理藏匿着恐怖主义的阴暗角落和黑暗洞穴之时，复仇主义者俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京和复兴论者中国的国家主席习近平，运用各自的国家力量以图对这种自由的、基于规则的格局进行重组。 它被称为“多极化”或中华民族的伟大复兴，其目标是击败和取代基于自由规则的全球秩序，因为中国和俄罗斯将这种秩序视为西方遏制中俄发展和保持全球霸权的动听说法和手段。yibaochina.com

自由的、基于规则的全球秩序已经酝酿了相当长的时间，但直到冷战结束后才占据主导地位。 它是启蒙运动、科学和工业革命、民主浪潮以及全球人权运动的最高成就。 它始于欧洲，随后传播到西半球，然后传播到世界其他地方，其成就显著。 其受益人比他们的前辈或生活在秩序边界之外的更长寿、更健康、更加富有、受教育程度更高。 在自由、基于规则的秩序之下，生活水平和生活质量的改善是非凡的，也是历史上前所未有的。yibaochina.com

与此相对的是，我们在莫斯科和北京的对手提供的是一种社会管控式的生活，其特点是强制的稳定，而这种稳定基础是精心筛选的信息来源和信息流动、无处不在的监视、以安全为导向的对政权的忠诚和服从、不断的灌输和对异议的镇压。yibaochina.com

这种模式可能最适合俄罗斯、中国及其追随者，我们不应该试图去改变它，这项任务最好留给它们自己的人民。 只要我们的系统正常运行，并能够抵御硬实力和软实力的侵犯，那么与中俄模式共存所带来的风险是可控的。 这使我们在冷战时期生存下来——确切地说是繁荣起来。yibaochina.com

对抗俄罗斯和中国咄咄逼人的修正主义的全面抗衡策略是“加强中坚力量”。 中坚力量是什么？ 它既不是西方，也不是东方，不是北方，也不是南方。 它不是一个针对俄罗斯、中国或任何人的组织。 “加强中坚力量”既不是遏制，也不是帝国式的扩张。中坚力量是由那些拥护自由的、基于规则的全球秩序的国家所组成，这些国家拥抱人类自由、社会公义以及《联合国宪章》和《世界人权宣言》中阐述的国际行为准则。yibaochina.com

今天，这个中坚力量包括北约联盟成员和合作伙伴、欧盟成员、AUKUS 和四方成员、五眼联盟以及其他一些主要成员。 但是，这个中坚力量并非固定不变，也不排他。 在中坚力量联盟和威权联盟之间，还有着大量的骑墙国家，它们不愿意或没有准备好在这两种全球秩序或推进这些秩序的两个联盟之间做选择。 这些是尚待争取的国家，它们可能会继续骑墙或是转而靠近或加入某一集团。 他们并非无足轻重，争取他们加盟的竞争将会非常激烈。 自由的、基于规则的秩序不需要扩张就能繁荣。 然而，收缩带来的风险是减少的选择机会和缩小的经济规模。 地理停滞会带来系统混乱和耗散的风险。 然而，这些可以通过积极鼓励创新、主动性和发明而加以避免。yibaochina.com

为了在激烈的竞争中获胜，中坚国家必须提供更好的协议、更好的通向安全、公义和繁荣的途径。 由于其长期致力于人权、政治权利、公民自由和法治原则，该中坚力量在这方面处于有利地位。中坚力量国家必须在国内外实践这些原则并积极竞争。yibaochina.com

中坚力量成员资格并不具有排他性。借用一个在国际上具有强大竞争力的美国理想来表述，那就是，任何国家都可以通过明确、毫不动摇地表明其对民有、民享、民治的核心价值观的承诺来加入。 这不仅仅是包容各方的民主共同体所要求的口头上的承诺。 未来的中坚力量成员必须符合政治联盟的标准，即加入北约或欧盟的标准。yibaochina.com

“加强中坚力量”必须包括加强各国内部以及成员国之间的核心政治价值观。中坚力量国家必须加倍努力，化解和缓和遗留的争端和敌对行动，例如韩国和日本之间或希腊和土耳其之间的争端和敌对行动。 当一个中坚力量国家开始偏离自由、以规则为基础的核心道路时，社会不应急于谴责，而应鼓励他们重新致力于核心价值观。 这可能需要时间和通过宪法对政府进行变革。yibaochina.com

目前，土耳其和匈牙利正在偏离这个道路。 他们的领导人是自恋者和顽固的民粹主义者，他们对通过强迫、羞辱或威胁来要求他们回归核心道路的所有努力反应不佳。 密集、娴熟的外交和经过调整的激励措施，也许比排斥他们能更加有效地引导他们参与巩固中坚力量的集体努力。虽然他们的任期是有限的，但这场斗争将永远持续。yibaochina.com

我们的对手强悍、无情、不择手段； 与他们的竞争是客观现实。中坚力量国家不能忽视独裁对手今天强加给他们的挑战——他们不能放弃乌克兰或台湾。 然而，对手引发的反射性关注会使我们偏离综合考量中另一个同样重要的部分——我们的盟友、合作伙伴和犹豫不决中的国家。yibaochina.com

迈克尔·米克劳西克 (Michael Miklaucic) 是国防大学高级研究员和《棱镜》杂志(PRISM Journal) 的主编。 本文表达的观点是他的个人观点，而非国防大学或任何美国政府机构的官方声明。yibaochina.com

约翰·R·艾伦 (John R. Allen) 于 2017 年 11 月至 2022 年 6 月期间担任布鲁金斯学会 (Brookings Institution) 主席，此前曾担任布鲁金斯学会外交政策项目杰出研究员。 艾伦是一位退役的美国海军陆战队四星上将，也是北约国际安全援助部队（ISAF）和驻阿富汗美军的前指挥官。yibaochina.com

原文链接:https://nationalinterest.org/feature/save-liberal-world-order-consolidate-core-207895yibaochina.com
December 12, 2023  Topic: Great Power Competition  Region: Eurasia  Tags: End Of HistoryAuthoritarianismLiberal World OrderGreat Power CompetitionRussiaChina

To Save the Liberal World Order, Consolidate the Core

A broadly conceived strategy to preserve and strengthen the liberal, rules-based global order is needed: the leaders of that order must “consolidate the core.”

by Michael Miklaucic John R. Allen

The post-Cold War world order is fractured beyond recovery. Autocratic regimes are set on replacing it with a global order conducive to authoritarian governance based on pervasive surveillance, social and political control, and rigid regime leadership. A broadly conceived strategy to preserve and strengthen the liberal, rules-based global order is needed, and the leaders of that order must “consolidate the core.”

For roughly twenty-five years following the demise of the Soviet Union and its communist ideology, the democratic, capitalist model of governance appeared to be the last man standing. Alternative models of state and global governance were discredited or abandoned. 

While the West focused on cleaning up the obscure corners and dark caves where terrorism still lurked, revanchist Russian president Vladimir Putin and Chinese revivalist president Xi Jinping directed their respective elements of national power toward a reordering of this liberal, rules-based paradigm. Christened as “multipolarism” or the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, its goal is the defeat and replacement of the liberal rules-based global order, which both China and Russia view as a euphemism for containment and a rubric for sustaining Western global hegemony.

The liberal, rules-based global order has been in the making for quite a long time, though only dominant since the end of the Cold War. It is the culmination of the Enlightenment, the scientific and industrial revolutions, the democratic waves, and the global human rights movement. It began in Europe, then spread to the Western hemisphere, then elsewhere throughout the world, and its accomplishments are significant. Its beneficiaries live longer in much better health, lead vastly more prosperous lives, and are substantially better educated than their predecessors or those living outside of the order’s perimeter. The improvements in the standard of living and quality of life under the liberal, rules-based order are extraordinary and historically unprecedented.

Alternatively, our adversaries in Moscow and Beijing offer a socially controlled life characterized by enforced stability built upon carefully curated information sources and flows, pervasive surveillance, security-based directly on loyalty and regime obedience, constant indoctrination, and repression of dissent.

This model may be optimal for Russia, China, and their followers, and it should not be our intent to transform them, a task best left to their own people. The risk in operating beside such systems is manageable so long as our system is functioning properly and can defend itself against the aggression of both the hard and soft power. This is how we survived—indeed flourished—during the Cold War.

The broad counterpoise to Russia’s and China’s assertive revisionism is “consolidating the core.” What is the core? It is neither the West nor the East nor the North nor the South. It is not a grouping against Russia, China, or anyone. “Consolidating the core” is neither containment nor imperial expansionism. The core consists of those states committed to the liberal, rules-based global order embracing human liberty, social justice, and the norms of international behavior articulated in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

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Today, the core consists of the NATO alliance members and partners, the members of the European Union, the AUKUS and Quad members, the Five Eyes, and a few notable others. However, the core is not frozen nor exclusive. Between the core and the authoritarian coalition exists a large number of hedging states unwilling or unready to commit to one or the other visions of global order or the coalitions advancing them. These are contested states that might continue to hedge or lean toward or join one group or the other. They are not insignificant, and the competition over their allegiance will be intense. The liberal, rules-based order does not require expansion to flourish. However, contraction poses the risks of reduced choices and economic scale. Geographical stagnation does risk system entropy and dissipation. However, these can be avoided so long as innovation, initiative, and invention are enthusiastically encouraged.

To prevail in the competition over the contested spaces, the core must offer a better deal, a better pathway to security, justice, and prosperity. The core is well-positioned for this due to its long-standing commitment to the principles of human rights, political rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law. Core countries must practice these principles both at home and abroad and compete aggressively.

Membership of the core is not exclusive. Any country can join by demonstrating clearly and consistently its commitment to the core values, government of, for, and by the people, to borrow an American aspiration that competes well internationally. Not merely rhetorical adherence like the all-inclusive Community of Democracies. Would-be core members would have to meet the standards of political alignment that would qualify for entry into NATO or the EU.

“Consolidating the core” must include reinforcing the core political values both in individual states as well as between member countries. The core countries must redouble their efforts to mitigate and soften legacy disputes and hostilities, such as between South Korea and Japan or between Greece and Turkey. And when a core country begins to veer from the path of the liberal, rules-based core, the community must not rush to castigate but rather incentivize re-commitment to the core values. This may take time and constitutional changes of government.

Today, Turkey and Hungary are departing from this pattern. Their leaders are narcissistic, obstinate populists who do not respond well to efforts to coerce, shame, or threaten them into aligned behavior. Intensive, skilled diplomacy and calibrated incentives might be more effective to induce them into the collective effort to consolidate the core rather than ostracizing them. In any case, their time in office is inevitably finite, and this struggle is forever.

Our adversaries are relentless, merciless, and unscrupulous; Competition with them is existential. The core countries cannot neglect the challenges forced upon them today by their authoritarian adversaries—they cannot abandon Ukraine or Taiwan. Yet the reflexive focus on our adversaries diverts us from the other, equally important element of the equation—our allies, partners, and the undecided.

Michael Miklaucic is a Senior Fellow at National Defense University and the Editor-in-Chief of the PRISM Journal. The views expressed in this article are personal and not official statements of NDU or any U.S. government agency.

John R. Allen was president of the Brookings Institution from November 2017 to June 2022, having previously served as a distinguished fellow in the Foreign Policy Program at Brookings. Allen is a retired U.S. Marine Corps four-star general and former commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan.

Image: Gints Ivuskans / Shutterstock.com