評判亨利·基辛格

l  達到目的就可以不擇手段嗎？

《外交事务》作者：小約瑟夫‧S‧奈  2023 年 11 月 30 日

美國前國務卿亨利·基辛格於 2015 年 9 月在柏林   法布里齊奧·本施/路透社

人們該如何將道德運用到亨利·基辛格的政治才能中？一個人如何平衡他的成就和他的罪行？自從基辛格成為我在哈佛大學的教授和後來的同事以來，我一直在努力解決這些問題。2012 年 4 月，我在哈佛大學的一大群觀眾面前幫忙採訪了他，並詢問他在擔任美國總統理查德·尼克森和傑拉爾德·福特的國務卿期間是否會採取不同的做法。起初，他說不。轉念一想，他說他希望自己在中東能更加活躍。但他沒有提及柬埔寨、智利、巴基斯坦或越南。大廳後面的一名抗議者高喊：“戰犯！”

基辛格是一位複雜的思想家。與國際關係理論家漢斯·摩根索等其他戰後歐洲移民一樣，他批評了二戰前美國外交政策的幼稚理想主義。但基辛格並不是一個不講道德的人。「你 不能 只看權力，」他在哈佛對觀眾說。“國家總是代表正義的理念。” 他在著作中指出，世界秩序既依賴權力平衡，也依賴合法性。正如他曾經對他的前助手、1985年至1989年擔任駐華大使的溫斯頓·洛德（Winston
Lord）所說，政治家最需要的品質是「品格和勇氣」。需要品格，“因為真正艱難的決定是
51-49”，因此領導者必須擁有“道德力量”來做出這些決定。領導者需要勇氣才能「獨行一段路」。就越南而言，他相信他有責任結束越戰。但他表示，他沒有權力以「會損害美國捍衛盟友和自由事業的能力」的方式結束這一進程。

評估國際關係中的道德是困難的，基辛格的遺產尤其複雜。在他長期的政府任期內，他取得了許多巨大的成功，包括在中國、蘇聯和中東問題上的成功。基辛格也有重大失敗，包括越戰的結束方式。但在網路上，他的遺產是正面的。在核戰幽靈籠罩的世界裡，他的決定使國際秩序更加穩定和安全。

l  價值判斷

對於外交政策從業者來說，最重要的問題之一是如何判斷全球政治領域的道德。真正的無道德主義者只會迴避它。例如，一位法國外交官曾告訴我，由於道德在國際關係中毫無意義，所以他只根據法國的利益來決定一切。然而，拒絕所有其他利益的選擇本身就是一個深刻的道德決定。

世界政治本質上有三種不同的心理地圖，每一種都會對國家應該如何行事產生不同的答案。現實主義者接受一些道德義務，但認為它們受到無政府政治的嚴酷現實的嚴重限制。對這些思想家來說，謹慎是首要美德。另一方面是世界主義者，他們認為國家應該平等對待所有人類。他們認為邊界在道德上是任意的，並認為政府對外國人負有重大道德義務。介於兩者之間的是自由主義者。他們認為，國家有責任在決策中考慮道德問題，但世界分為具有道德意義的社區和國家。儘管這些國家之上沒有政府，自由主義者認為國際體係有其秩序。世界可能是無政府主義的，但有足夠的基本實踐和製度——例如國家之間的權力平衡、規範、國際法和國際組織——來建立一個框架，使各國能夠做出有意義的道德選擇，至少在大多數國家是這樣。案例。

現實主義是大多數領導者使用的預設立場。鑑於世界是主權國家之一，這是明智的：現實主義實際上是最好的起點。問題在於，許多現實主義者止步不前，沒有意識到世界主義和自由主義對於思考如何制定外交政策是有價值的。問題往往是程度問題，領導人不應武斷地拒絕人權和製度。由於永遠不存在完美的安全，因此他們必須先弄清楚自己的國家需要何種程度的安全，然後在製定政策時考慮其他價值觀（例如福利、身分或外國人的權利）。

最終，他們可能會將道德因素納入各種決策中。畢竟，大多數外交政策選擇並不涉及生存。相反，它們涉及諸如是否向獨裁盟友出售武器或是否批評另一個國家的人權行為等問題。它們涉及關於是否接納難民、如何貿易以及如何應對氣候變遷等問題的辯論。

鐵桿現實主義者最終會從國家安全的角度來對待所有決定，定義非常狹隘。他們願意做出許多道德上可疑的選擇來改善國家的安全。1940 年，法國向納粹投降後，英國首相邱吉爾襲擊了阿爾及利亞海岸的法國海軍艦艇，殺死了數千名中立的水手，以防止艦隊落入德國手中。1945年，美國總統杜魯門對日本使用原子彈，造成10萬多名平民死亡。

但現實主義領導人忽略了艱難的權衡，只是在迴避嚴峻的道德問題。“安全至上”和“正義以秩序為前提”，但領導人有義務評估情況與霍布斯或洛克思想地圖的契合程度，或者他們是否可以遵循其他重要價值觀而不真正危及國家安全。

現實主義是大多數領導者使用的預設立場。

同時，領導者不能總是遵循簡單的道德規則。他們可能需要做出不道德的選擇，以防止甚至是巨大的災難；例如，那些在核戰中被燒毀的人就沒有人權。正如著名的歐裔美國現實主義者阿諾德·沃爾弗斯（Arnold
Wolfers）曾經說過的那樣，在評判領導人的國際道德時，人們最能希望的是他們做出「環境允許的最佳道德選擇」。

確實如此，但如此廣泛的謹慎規則很容易在方便時被濫用。領導人可以聲稱他們必須採取可怕的行動來保護自己的國家，而事實上，情況給了他們更大的迴旋餘地。分析師不應簡單地相信政策制定者的話，而應根據其目的、手段和後果來判斷他們。為此，專家們可以從所有三種心智圖中汲取智慧：現實主義、自由主義和世界主義（按順序）。

最終，當分析師著眼於目標時，他們不應該期望領導人會以類似於他們在國內社會中追求的方式在國際層面上追求正義。就連著名的自由派哲學家約翰·羅爾斯也認為，他的正義理論的條件只適用於國內社會。同時，羅爾斯認為，自由社會有超越國界的義務，清單應包括互助和尊重確保基本人權的機構。他也寫道，多元化世界中的人們應該盡可能決定自己的事務。

因此，分析師應該問，領導人的目標是否包括表達在國內外具有廣泛吸引力的價值觀的願景。但他們也應該問，領導者的目標是否謹慎地平衡有吸引力的價值觀和評估的風險。換句話說，分析師應該評估領導者的願景是否有可能成功。

在評估道德手段時，專家可以根據「正義戰爭」標準的長期傳統來評判領導人，該標準認為，國家使用武力必須是成比例的和有區別的。他們可以考慮羅爾斯的自由主義關注，即進行最低限度的干預，以尊重他人的權利和製度。至於評估後果，人們可以問領導人是否成功地促進了國家的長期國家利益？他們是否盡可能尊重世界價值觀，避免極端孤立和對外國人造成不必要的傷害；以及他們是否透過促進真理和信任來教育追隨者，從而擴大道德話語。
這些標準是謙虛的，源自於現實主義、自由主義和世界主義的見解。但它們提供了一些基本指導，超越了關於謹慎的簡單概括。我將這種方法稱為「自由寫實主義」。它從現實主義開始，但並沒有結束。
l  看看帳本

基辛格如何衡量這些標準？他當然取得了巨大的成功：開放中國、與蘇聯緩和關係、管理中東危機，這一切都讓世界變得更安全。例如，在中國問題上，基辛格和尼克森有遠見且大膽地引導世界政治擺脫冷戰兩極格局，並將北京重新融入國際體系。他們不得不忽視毛澤東極政權的醜惡本質。

同樣，在處理與莫斯科的緩和和軍備控制方面，基辛格不得不接受另一個極權主義政權的合法性，並且在推動克里姆林宮允許猶太人移民方面比許多美國人希望的要慢。儘管如此，他的立場有助於降低核戰的風險，並為蘇聯本身逐漸被侵蝕創造了條件。在這裡，道德收益再次遠遠超過成本。儘管在中東贖罪日戰爭期間基辛格冒著風險將美國核武警戒等級提升至DEFCON 3，但事實證明基辛格的判斷是正確的。儘管水門事件醜聞迫使尼克森辭職，但他最終還是設法緩解了該地區的緊張局勢。

但帳本還有另一面。基辛格道德政治家的失敗包括從1969年到1970年轟炸柬埔寨、沒有採取任何行動來制止巴基斯坦在1971年印巴戰爭中的暴行，以及支持1973年智利的政變。

首先考慮智利。美國政府並沒有煽動推翻該國民選總統並扶植軍事獨裁者的政變，但基辛格明確表示華盛頓並不反對。他的支持者認為，鑑於前政權是左翼政權並且可能落入蘇聯的勢力範圍，華盛頓別無選擇，只能支持軍政府。但在智利擁有一個右翼政府對於美國在兩極世界中的全球信譽來說並不是至關重要，而左翼政府的安全威脅也不足以成為慫恿其推翻的理由。畢竟，基辛格曾經將智利比喻為一把指向南極洲心臟的匕首。

在孟加拉從巴基斯坦分裂出去的戰爭中，基辛格和尼克森因沒有譴責巴基斯坦總統葉海亞汗在孟加拉的鎮壓和流血事件而受到批評，這場鎮壓和流血導致至少30萬孟加拉人死亡，並導致大批難民湧入印度。基辛格辯稱，他需要保持沉默，以確保葉海亞幫助與中國建立關係。但他也承認，基辛格慫恿尼克森個人對印度總理英迪拉甘地的厭惡也是一個因素。

1970 年對柬埔寨的轟炸本應摧毀越共的滲透路線，但最終，這些攻擊並沒有縮短或結束戰爭。他們所做的就是幫助種族滅絕的紅色高棉在柬埔寨掌權，導致超過 150 萬人死亡。對於一個宣揚保護自由的長期願景重要性的人來說，這是三個失敗。
越南的意義
然後是越戰。基辛格將他在衝突期間的政策描述為可能的成功， 如果不是水門事件和國會決定撤回對美國介入的支持，這些決定本可以拯救南越作為一個自由社會。但這是對一段複雜歷史的自私描述。基辛格和尼克森原本希望將軍控問題與越南連結起來，試圖讓蘇聯向河內施壓，要求停止攻擊南方。但當這些希望被證明是虛幻的時，他們決定透過談判解決方案，從而在美國撤軍和西貢政府垮台之間產生基辛格所說的「適當的間隔」。美國和北越最終於 1973 年 1 月在巴黎簽署和平協議，允許北韓將軍隊留在南方。當基辛格私下被問及他認為南越政府還能生存多久時，他回答說：“如果他們幸運的話，他們可以堅持一年半。” 最終，他離目標並不遙遠。（南方僅存活了兩年多。）

尼克森和基辛格確實結束了越戰，但他們的努力付出了高昂的道德代價。在他們執政的三年裡，有超過 21,000 名美國人死亡，而約翰遜領導下的美國人有 36,756 人死亡，甘迺迪領導下的美國人有 108 人死亡。印度支那的傷亡人數要大得多：數百萬越南人和柬埔寨人在他們的任期內被殺害。基辛格和尼克森一直在努力維護華盛頓的信譽——這是國際事務中的一個重要屬性，但目前還不清楚創造一個適度的「體面間隔」是否值得付出如此毀滅性的代價。

道德選擇有時是兩害相權取其輕。如果基辛格和尼克森聽從威廉·富布賴特和喬治·艾肯等美國參議員的建議，儘早撤軍，接受西貢最終會被擊敗的事實，美國的全球實力可能會受到一些損害，但美國的信譽無論如何都會受到損害。西貢在 1975 年。在 1969 年期間接受失敗並宣布撤軍將是一個勇敢但政治代價高昂的舉動。基辛格和尼克森在中國問題上展現了採取此類行動的能力。然而在越南，他們卻沒有這麼做。相反，他們的選擇並沒有改變最終的結果，事實證明，這付出了生命和信譽的代價。

基辛格有時未能履行他的品格和勇氣的道德美德。而且，他的一些手段也值得懷疑。國際關係是道德的艱難環境，外交政策是價值觀妥協的世界。但就後果而言，世界因他的政治才能而變得更加美好，他的成功超過了他的失敗。

JOSEPH S. NYE, JR. 是哈佛大學傑出服務榮譽教授，也是《道德重要嗎？》一書的作者。總統和外交政策從羅斯福到川普。H的回憶錄《美國世紀的生活》於一月出版。
Judging Henry Kissinger
Did the Ends Justify the Means?

By Joseph S.
Nye, Jr.

November 30, 2023

Former U.S. Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger in Berlin, September 2015

Fabrizio Bensch / Reuters

How should one apply morality to Henry

Kissinger’s statesmanship? How does one balance his accomplishments against his
misdeeds? I have wrestled with those questions since Kissinger was my
professor, and later colleague, at Harvard University. In April 2012, I helped
interview him before a large audience at Harvard and asked whether, in
hindsight, he would have done anything differently during his time as secretary
of state for U.S. Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. At first, he said
no. On second thought, he said he wished he had been more active in the Middle
East. But he made no mention of Cambodia, Chile, Pakistan, or Vietnam. A
protester in the back of the hall shouted out: “war criminal!”

Kissinger was a complex thinker. As with
other postwar European émigrés, such as the international relations theorist
Hans Morgenthau, he criticized the naive idealism of pre–World War II U.S.
foreign policy. But Kissinger was not an amoralist. “You can’t look
only at power,” he told the audience at Harvard. “States always represent an
idea of justice.” In his writings, he noted that world order rested on
both a balance of power and a sense of legitimacy. As he once told Winston Lord,
his former aide and the ambassador to China from 1985 to 1989, the qualities
most needed in a statesman are “character and courage.” Character was needed
“because the decisions that are really tough are 51–49,” so leaders must have
“moral strength” to make them. Courage was required so leaders could “walk
alone part of the way.” In the case of Vietnam, he believed he had a mandate to
end the Vietnam War. But, he said, he did not have a mandate to end it “on
terms that would undermine America’s ability to defend its allies and the cause
of freedom.”
 
Evaluating ethics in international
relations is difficult, and Kissinger’s legacy is particularly complex. Over
his long tenure in government, he had many great successes, including with
China and the Soviet Union and the Middle East. Kissinger also had major
failures, including in how the Vietnam War ended. But on net, his legacy is
positive. In a world haunted by the specter of nuclear war, his decisions made
the international order more stable and safer.
 
VALUE JUDGMENT
 
One of the most important questions for
foreign policy practitioners is how to judge morality in the realm of global
politics. A true amoralist simply ducks it. A French diplomat, for instance,
once told me that since morality made no sense in international relations, he
decided everything solely on the interests of France. Yet the choice to reject
all other interests was itself a profound moral decision.
 
There are essentially three different
mental maps of world politics, each of which generates a different answer as to
how states should behave. Realists accept some moral obligations but see them
as severely limited by the harsh reality of anarchic politics. To these
thinkers, prudence is the prime virtue. At the other end of the spectrum are
cosmopolitans, who believe that states should treat all humans equally. They
see borders as ethically arbitrary and believe that governments have major
moral obligations to foreigners. In between are liberals. They believe that
states have a serious responsibility to consider ethics in their decisions but
that the world is divided into communities and states that have moral meaning.
Although there is no government above these countries, liberals think the
international system has an order to it. The world may be anarchic, but there
are enough rudimentary practices and institutions—such as the balance of power
between countries, norms, international law, and international organizations—to
establish a framework by which states can make meaningful moral choices, at
least in most cases.
 
Realism is the default position that most
leaders use. Given that the world is one of sovereign states, this is smart:
realism is, in fact, the best place to start. The problem is that many realists
stop where they begin rather than realizing that cosmopolitanism and liberalism
are valuable in thinking about how to approach foreign policy. The question is
often one of degree, and leaders should not arbitrarily reject human rights and
institutions. Since there is never perfect security, they must first figure out
what degree of security their states need before considering other values—such
as welfare, identity, or the rights of foreigners—in how they make policy.
Ultimately, they might factor morals into a wide range of decisions. Most
foreign policy choices, after all, do not involve survival. Instead, they
involve questions such as whether to sell weapons to authoritarian allies or
whether to criticize the human rights behavior of another country. They involve
debates about whether to take in refugees, how to trade, and what to do about
issues such as climate change.
Hardcore realists ultimately treat all
decisions in terms of national security, very narrowly defined. They are
willing to make many morally suspect choices to improve the security of their
country. In 1940, after France’s surrender to the Nazis, British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill attacked French naval ships on the Algerian coast, killing
thousands of now neutral sailors, to prevent the fleet from falling into German
hands. In 1945, U.S. President Harry Truman used the atomic bomb against Japan,
killing more than 100,000 civilians. But by ignoring hard tradeoffs, realist
leaders are simply ducking hard moral issues. “Security comes first” and
“justice presupposes order,” but leaders have an obligation to assess how
closely a situation fits a Hobbesian or Lockean mental map, or whether they
could follow other important values without truly jeopardizing their country’s
security.
Realism is the default position that most
leaders use.
At the same time, leaders cannot always
follow simple moral rules. They may need to make amoral choices to prevent even
great catastrophes; there are no human rights, for example, among those
incinerated in a nuclear war. As Arnold Wolfers, a prominent European American
realist, once said, the most one can hope for in judging the international
ethics of leaders is that they make “the best moral choices that circumstances
permit.”
This is true, but such a broad rule of
prudence can easily be abused when convenient. Leaders could claim they had to
commit a horrendous act to protect their country when, in fact, the
circumstances afforded them much greater leeway. Instead of simply taking
policymakers at their word, analysts should judge them in terms of their ends,
means, and consequences. To do so, experts can draw from the wisdom of all
three mental maps: realism, liberalism, and cosmopolitanism, in that order.
Ultimately, as analysts look at ends, they
should not expect that leaders will pursue justice at the international level
in ways that resemble what they might pursue in their domestic societies. Even
the renowned liberal philosopher John Rawls believed that the conditions for
his theory of justice applied only to domestic society. At the same time, Rawls
argued that there were duties beyond borders for a liberal society and that the
list should include mutual aid and respect for institutions that ensure basic
human rights. He also wrote that people in a diverse world deserved to
determine their own affairs as much as possible. Analysts should therefore ask
whether a leader’s goals include a vision that expresses widely attractive
values at home and abroad. But they should also ask if a leader’s goals
prudently balance attractive values against the assessed risks. In other words,
analysts should evaluate whether there is a reasonable prospect the leader’s
vision can succeed.
When it comes to evaluating ethical means,
experts can judge leaders by the long-standing tradition of “just war”
criteria, which holds that a state’s use of force must be proportional and
discriminate. They can factor in Rawls’s liberal concern for carrying out
minimal degrees of intervention in order to respect the rights and institutions
of others. As for evaluating consequences, people can ask whether leaders
succeeded in promoting their country’s long-term national interests; whether
they respected cosmopolitan values when possible by avoiding extreme insularity
and unnecessary damage to foreigners; and whether they educated their followers
by promoting truth and trust that broadened moral discourse.
These criteria are modest and derived from
the insights of realism, liberalism, and cosmopolitanism. But they provide some
basic guidance that goes beyond a simple generality about prudence. I call this
approach “liberal realism.” It begins with realism, but it does not end there.
LOOKING AT THE LEDGER
How does Kissinger measure up on these criteria?
He certainly had great successes: the opening of China, establishing détente
with the Soviet Union, and managing crises in the Middle East, all of which
made the world safer. On China, for instance, Kissinger and Nixon had the
vision and temerity to guide world politics away from Cold War bipolarity and
reintegrate Beijing into the international system. They had to ignore the ugly
nature of Mao Zedong’s totalitarian regime.
Similarly, in managing détente and arms
control with Moscow, Kissinger had to accept the legitimacy of another
totalitarian regime and go slower than many Americans wanted on pushing the
Kremlin to allow Jewish emigration. Nonetheless, his position helped lower the
risk of nuclear war and create the conditions in which the Soviet Union itself
gradually eroded. Here, again, the moral gains far outweighed the costs. And
although he took risks by raising the alert level of U.S. nuclear forces to
DEFCON 3 during the Yom Kippur War in the Middle East, Kissinger’s judgment
turned out to be right. Ultimately, he managed to reduce tensions in the region
despite the Watergate scandal that forced Nixon to resign.
But there is another side to the ledger.
Kissinger’s failures of moral statesmanship include bombing Cambodia from 1969
to 1970, doing nothing to stop Pakistan’s brutality in the Indian-Pakistani war
of 1971, and supporting a coup d’état in Chile in 1973. Consider, first, Chile.
The U.S. government did not instigate the coup that overthrew the country’s
democratically elected president and installed a military dictator, but
Kissinger made it clear that Washington was not opposed. His defenders argued
that Washington had no choice but to back a junta, given that the preceding
regime was leftist and might fall into the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence.
But having a right-wing government in Chile was not really vital to American
global credibility in a bipolar world, and the leftist government was not
nearly enough of a security threat to justify abetting its overthrow.
Kissinger, after all, once likened Chile to a dagger pointed at the heart of
Antarctica.
In the war of secession of Bangladesh from
Pakistan, Kissinger and Nixon were criticized for not condemning Pakistani
President Yahya Khan for his repression and bloodshed in Bangladesh, which
resulted in the deaths of at least 300,000 Bengalis and sent a flood of
refugees into India. Kissinger argued that his silence was needed to secure
Yahya’s help in establishing ties with China. But he has admitted that Nixon’s
personal dislike of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, which Kissinger
abetted, was also a factor.
The bombing of Cambodia in 1970 was
supposed to destroy Viet Cong infiltration routes, but ultimately, the attacks
did not shorten or end the war. What they did do is help the genocidal Khmer
Rouge take power in Cambodia, resulting in the deaths of over 1.5 million
people. For a man who extolled the importance of a long-term vision of
protecting freedom, these were three failures.
THE MEANING OF VIETNAM
Then there is the Vietnam War. Kissinger
described his policies during the conflict as a would-be success, decisions
that could have saved South Vietnam as a free society were it not for
Watergate and Congress’s decision to withdraw support for U.S. involvement. But
this is a self-serving account of a complex history. Kissinger and Nixon
originally hoped to link arms control issues to Vietnam, in an effort to get
the Soviets to pressure Hanoi to stop attacking the South. But when these hopes
proved illusory, they settled for a negotiated solution that would produce what
Kissinger called a “decent interval” between U.S. withdrawal and the collapse
of the government in Saigon. The United States and North Vietnam ultimately
signed a peace deal in Paris in January 1973, which allowed the North to leave
its army inside the South. When Kissinger was asked, privately, how long he
thought the South Vietnamese government could survive, he responded, “If
they’re lucky, they can hold out for a year and a half.” Ultimately, he was not
far off. (The South survived for just over two.)
Nixon and Kissinger did end the Vietnam
War, but their efforts came at a high moral cost. Just over 21,000 Americans
died during their three years of stewardship, compared with 36,756 under
Johnson and 108 under Kennedy. The toll in Indochina was far greater: millions
of Vietnamese and Cambodians were killed under their tenure. Kissinger and
Nixon kept fighting to preserve Washington’s credibility—an important attribute
in international affairs, but it is far from clear that creating a modest
“decent interval” was worth such a devastating toll.
Moral choices are sometimes the lesser of
evils. If Kissinger and Nixon had followed the advice of U.S. senators such as
William Fulbright and George Aiken and withdrawn early on, accepting that
Saigon would eventually be defeated, there would have been some damage to
American global power, but the country’s credibility suffered anyway, after
Saigon fell in 1975. Accepting defeat and declaring a withdrawal over the
course of 1969 would have been a courageous but politically costly move.
Kissinger and Nixon showed themselves capable of such moves when it came to
China; in Vietnam, however, they did not. Instead, their choices did not alter
the ultimate outcome, and it proved costly in lives as well as credibility.
Kissinger sometimes failed to live up to
his moral virtues of character and courage. Moreover, some of his means were
questionable. International relations are a difficult milieu for ethics, and
foreign policy is a world of compromises among values. But in terms of the
consequences, the world is a better place because of his statesmanship, and his
successes outweighed his failures.

贴主:Haisen2023于2023_12_04 16:20:33编辑