乔纳森·吉纳普：历史决定论与意义整体论：原旨主义翻译的失败（下）

作者：[美]乔纳森·吉纳普 译者：邹奕,李思洁

结语

无论从何等广泛的例子中进行剔除分析[101]，翻译都必须超越语词的原子式含义。证据的数量不是问题，解释的对象才是关键。系统地复原建国时期言语的原初含义，需要整体地翻译十八世纪的语言。只有这样，我们才能复原连接一个含义与下一个含义之间的结缔组织，以及赋予单个言语以特定内容的推论关系网络。

若要理解此种意义整体论，只能通过再次辩论来实现，在这种辩论中，关键的宪法条款得以相当具体的指涉。[102]任何关于建国时期的浓厚历史论的研究都涉及到这样的辩论——有时是为了追踪学术影响，或为了探测个人或政治动机，但总是为了将含义置于话语活动的流变中。[103]没有什么能代替仔细研究整个论点的逻辑。因为这样不仅表达的推论内容会变得清晰，更广泛的含义结构也会变得清晰。只有这样，隐藏的预设和缄默的逻辑连接词才会开始出现。维特根斯坦认为，我们应该习惯性地从内部学习语言游戏。[104]我们只有通过案例才能接触到语法。我们应该听从这一建议，根据建国时期的实际行动，从内部重新创建建国时期的语言游戏和相关实践。

毫无疑问，这项工作要求很高。学习如何在这类游戏中移动，就相当于掌握了一套概念性的词汇。我们必须和当地人居住在一起，尽力观察他们的语言行为，从而学习如何像他们曾经那么说话。没有可靠的替代方案。由于忽略了含义之间的整体联系，关键词搜索或者语料库语言错过了太多含义内容。[105]只有看到这些联系，原初含义才能再次出现。

长期以来，维特根斯坦、戴维森或者布兰德姆一直是严格的历史方法的核心人物，因此，不管大多数历史学者是否熟悉他们，大多数人都会认识到他们的训诫。除了斯金纳，基思·贝克（Keith Baker）、J. G. A.波科克（J. G. A. Pocock）、马克·贝维尔（Mark Bevir）的论著也尤其证实了这一事实。[106] 即便如此，历史学者也不需要被告知，厚重的历史语境对于理解历史言语的含义是不可或缺的。尽管如此，揭示这种哲学如何强化历史本能，有助于使观点更加清晰。语言整体论基本上也会导向历史学者长期推崇的历史决定论。原旨主义者应该重视此种观点。

意识到意义整体论和历史决定论，只是开始揭示完整翻译建国时期之话语实践所需要的东西。但是，就目前而言，对它们的欣赏至少表明了对索勒姆及其他一些原旨主义者之翻译方法的关键局限性，特别是包括，为什么将含义指向公共含义这一点，尽管索勒姆坚持这样做，但这并没有使他们脱离历史学者的技巧。所有的原旨主义者，无论他们所推崇的是何种原初含义，都必须表现出对历史决定论和意义整体论的敏感。换一种说法，也即为了真正复原宪法文本的原初含义，任何类型的原旨主义者都必须像历史学者那样行事。

注释:

[1] See Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas: The Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 82, No. 2, 2013, p. 722; Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History As Constitutional Theory, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 101, No. 4, 2015, p. 1113; Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis

[2] Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas: The Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 82, No. 2, 2013, pp. 725-740.

[3] 需要说明的是，“historical translation”可谓本文原文的核心概念，本文将其直译为“历史翻译”。

[4]“历史解读”对应的原文为“historicize”，意为在历史语境中解读某事。

[5] Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History As Constitutional Theory, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 101, No. 4, 2015, pp. 1112-1114.

[6] Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and History, p. 1 (Aug. 29, 2014) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review); see also Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History As Constitutional Theory, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 101, No. 4, 2015, p. 1155.

[7] See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 82, No. 2, 2013, p. 455; 

[8] 这种区分在索勒姆的论著中随处可见，但在晚近原旨主义者的学术研究中也被证明是重要的。

[9] Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History As Constitutional Theory, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 101, No. 4, 2015, pp. 1123, 1115-1116.

[10] Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History As Constitutional Theory, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 101, No. 4, 2015, p. 1155; Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and History, pp. 1, 2 (Aug. 29, 2014) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review).

[11] Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and History, p. 1 (Aug. 29, 2014) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review); See Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History As Constitutional Theory, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 101, No. 4, 2015, p. 1164.

[12] Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and History, p. 1 (Aug. 29, 2014) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review).

[13] 关于向公共含义原旨主义的转变，参见Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 82, No. 2, 2013, p. 377; Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2004, pp. 609-610.

[14] See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 91, No. 6, 2003, p. 1115.

[15] See generally John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution, Harvard University Press, 2013; Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, West Group, 2012; Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas, 1999.

[16] See Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, Notre Dame Law Review, Vol. 89, No. 2, 2013, pp. 494-502, 507（解释宪法固有的交际限制); 

[17] 该观点已经被一些宪法学者和类似的历史学者所强调。

[18] Lawrence B. Solum, What Is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory, in The Challenge of Originalism: Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, p. 33 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011) (ebook).

[19] Lawrence B. Solum, What Is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory, in The Challenge of Originalism: Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, p. 33 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011) (ebook); See Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History As Constitutional Theory, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 101, No. 4, 2015, p. 1150（承认原旨主义必须避免不合时宜）; Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, Notre Dame Law Review, Vol. 91, No.1, 2015, pp. 13-16, 62-68（识别“语言漂移”）。

[20] Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History As Constitutional Theory, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 101, No. 4, 2015, pp. 1116-1118, 1125-1126.

[21] Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and History, pp. 12-13 (Aug. 29, 2014) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review).

[22] Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas: The Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 82, No. 2, 2013, pp. 740-742. David Thomas Konig, Why the Second Amendment Has a Preamble: Original Public Meaning and the Political Culture of Written Constitutions in Revolutionary America, UCLA Law Review, Vol. 56, No.5, 2009, p. 1302.

[23] Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and History, pp. 2, 13 (Aug. 29, 2014) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review).

[24] Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, University of Illinois Law Review, Vol. 2013, No. 5, 2013, p. 1942.

[25] Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History As Constitutional Theory, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 101, No. 4, 2015, pp. 1125-1132; Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and History, pp. 13-14 (Aug. 29, 2014) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review).

[26] Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History As Constitutional Theory, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 101, No. 4, 2015, pp. 1125-1132.

[27] See Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism, Harvard University Press, 2011, pp. 3-58; Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty, Princeton University Press, 2014, pp. 389-395; John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution, Harvard University Press, 2013, pp. 123-126; Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, West Group, 2012, pp. 15-28.

[28] Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 103, No. 2, 2009, pp. 945-946; Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, Notre Dame Law Review, Vol. 91, No.1, 2015, pp. 15-16.

[29] Clifford Geertz, The Way We Think Now: Toward an Ethnography of Modern Thought, in Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology, Basic Books, 1983, pp. 152-153.

[30] 由于哲学中语言学转向的一个关键结果是认识到，拥有思想在本质上就是拥有使用语言的能力，吉尔茨对人类思维的观察被证明更适用于理解人类语言。See, e.g., Robert B. Brandom, Perspectives on Pragmatism: Classical, Recent, and Contemporary, Harvard University Press, 2011, pp.22-23; Michael Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language, Harvard University Press, 1993; Richard Rorty, Philosophy As Cultural Politics, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 176; Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton University Press, 1979; Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Harvard University Press, 1997; Donald Davidson, Seeing Through Language, in Truth, Language, and History, Oxford University Press, 2005.

[31] “分立的部分”对应的原文为“discreet parts”，但若按原文翻译将使读者费解。我们认为，前述原文中的“discreet”应该是“discrete”之误。——译者注

[32] See generally Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty, Princeton University Press, 2014, pp. 389-395; Lino A. Graglia, How the Constitution Disappeared, in Joseph S. McNamara & Lissa Roche ed., Still the Law of the Land?, Hillsdale College Press, 1987.

[33] Bernard Bailyn, Sometimes an Art: Nine Essays on History, Knopf, 2015, p. 22.

[34] Rhys Isaac, The Transformation of Virginia 1740-1790, Omohundro Institute and University of North Carolina Press, 1999, p. 5.

[35] 更多有关历史决定论的论述一般参见Jonathan Gienapp, Using Beard to Overcome Beardianism: Charles Beard's Forgotten Historicism and the Ideas-Interests Dichotomy, Constitutional Commentary, Vol. 29, No.3, 2014.

[36] Bernard Bailyn, Sometimes an Art: Nine Essays on History, Knopf, 2015, p. 22.

[37] See generally Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, Belknap Press, 1967; Stanley Elkins & Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788-1800, Oxford University Press, 1993; Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, Omohundro Institute and University of North Carolina Press, 1969. 有关他们发起的史学革命的更多信息，参见Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, The Journal of American History, Vol. 79, No. 11, 1992, p. 22.

[38] Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, Omohundro Institute and University of North Carolina Press, 1969, p. xvi. 具有讽刺意味且发人深省的是，原旨主义者经常赞许地引用伍德的精湛研究，他们几乎没有意识到，该研究的基本自负往往会破坏他们所争论的大部分内容。说明性的例子，参见Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 70, No. 3, 2003, pp. 933-934.

[39] 关于这些极端例子的讨论，参见Mark Bevir, Why Historical Distance Is Not a Problem, History and Theory, Vol. 50, No. 4, 2011, p. 24; Donald Davidson, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford University Press, 2001; A. P. Martinich, A Moderate Logic of the History of Ideas, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 73, No. 4, 2012, p. 610; Richard Rorty, The World Well Lost, in Consequences of Pragmatism, University Of Minnesota Press, 1982, p. 4.

[40] 这个问题很普遍。See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution, Harvard University Press, 2013; Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, Against Interpretive Supremacy, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 103, No. 6, 2005, p. 1540. 例如，一些法学者提出，这些训诫无济于事，参见Larry D. Kramer, When Lawyers Do History, George Washington Law Review, Vol. 72, No.1-2, 2003; H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 73, No. 4, 1987, p. 673.

[41] Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, Notre Dame Law Review, Vol. 89, No. 2, 2013, p. 498.

[42] Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History As Constitutional Theory, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 101, No. 4, 2015, p. 1144.

[43] See generally Jonathan Gienapp, Historical Translation and Constitutional Originalism (Sept. 1, 2015) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).

[44] 此类例子不胜枚举。See, e.g., Keith Michael Baker, Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture in the Eighteenth Century, Cambridge University Press, 1990; Mark Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas, Cambridge University Press, 1999; Elizabeth A. Clark, History, Theory, Text: Historians and the Linguistic Turn, Harvard University Press, 2004; Ian Hacking, Historical Ontology, Harvard University Press, 2002; J. G. A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century, Cambridge University Press, 1985; William H. Sewell, Jr., Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation, The University of Chicago Press, 2005; Gabrielle M. Spiegel, History, Historicism, and the Social Logic of the Text in the Middle Ages, Speculum, Vol. 65, No. 1, 1990, pp. 59-86.

[45] Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, The Poverty of Public Meaning Originalism, San Diego Law Review, Vol. 48, No.2, 2011, p. 588.

[46] Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History As Constitutional Theory, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 101, No. 4, 2015, pp. 1122, 1128-1129（违背了康德学派对哲学推理之逻辑优先权的基本坚持，认为任何关于交际的历史或者法律描述都必须与哲学家和语言学者工作相协调）。关于哲学与历史的关系，我提出的解读来自Philosophy in History, Richard Rorty et al. eds., Cambridge University Press, 1984.

[47] See generally Paul Grice, Studies in the Way of Words, Harvard University Press, 1989.

[48] Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History As Constitutional Theory, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 101, No. 4, 2015, p. 1153; Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and History, p. 26 (Aug. 29, 2014) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review).

[49] “施为的习惯”对应的原文为“the conventions surrounding the performance of”。“施为”一语“系指实施某种行为。斯金纳认为：言语的运用是一种行为，具有“施为”的目的。“施为的习惯”即指言语运用的习惯。——译者注

[50] Quentin Skinner, “Social Meaning” and the Explanation of Social Action, in James Tully ed., Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics, Princeton University Press, 1988.

[51] 在这一论点上，斯金纳总是被误解。他最清晰的论述，参见Quentin Skinner, A Reply to My Critics, in James Tully ed., Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics, Princeton University Press, 1988, pp. 231, 278-280.

[52] Quentin Skinner, A Reply to My Critics, in James Tully ed., Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics, Princeton University Press, 1988, p. 279.

[53] Machiavelli, The Prince, in Charles W. Eliot ed., The Harvard Classics, Forgotten Books, Vol. 36, 1910, p. 68.

[54] Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, in James Tully ed., Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics, Princeton University Press, 1988, pp. 61-63.

[55] Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History As Constitutional Theory, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 101, No. 4, 2015, pp. 1132-1136.

[56] 索勒姆不同意言外之力是公共含义的重要组成部分，他或许为此肯定性地引用了A. P. Martinich, Four Senses of “Meaning” in the History of Ideas: Quentin Skinner's Theory of Historical Interpretation, Journal of the Philosophy of History, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2009. 但马蒂尼奇（Martinich）的批评意见是：只有句子而非整个文本可以具备言外的维度，这种调和可能导致我们质疑作为单一言语的《宪法》是否具有言外之力，但并非否认其条款具有这种效力。

[57] Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, in James Tully ed., Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics, Princeton University Press, 1988, pp. 63-64.

[58] Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and History, p. 17 (Aug. 29, 2014) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review); See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History As Constitutional Theory, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 101, No. 4, 2015, p. 1134.

[59] Quentin Skinner, A Reply to My Critics, in James Tully ed., Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics, Princeton University Press, 1988, pp. 279.斯金纳最犀利的批评者，参见Mark Bevir, Why Historical Distance Is Not a Problem, History and Theory, Vol. 50, No. 4, 2011, pp. 40-50, 135-136（认为基于习惯建立的“语言含义”不能固定“解释学含义”，它是特定言语的预期表现）。

[60] Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History As Constitutional Theory, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 101, No. 4, 2015, p. 1151.

[61] Solum, Originalism and History, p. 25 (Aug. 29, 2014) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review) (alteration in original).

[62] Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History As Constitutional Theory, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 101, No. 4, 2015, pp. 1151-1152.

[63] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations§43, p. 20e (G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 1953). 关于维特根斯坦后来的工作是如何对他早期的哲学进行戏剧性修正的，参见Richard Rorty, Wittgenstein and the Linguistic Turn, in Philosophy As Culture Politics, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 160-175.

[64] See Richard Rorty, Wittgenstein and the Linguistic Turn, in Philosophy As Culture Politics, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 160-175.

[65] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. pt. I (G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 1953).

[66] 维特根斯坦指的是哲学中悠久的表征主义传统，可以追溯到柏拉图，但更直接的是分析哲学的主导趋势，特别是逻辑实证主义，它试图将语言分解为其原子属性以进行逻辑概念之分析。See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations §§ 23, 46 (G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 1953).

[67] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations § 107 (G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 1953).

[68] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations §§ 7-42 (G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 1953).

[69] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations§7 (第一次讨论概念) (G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 1953).

[70] Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty § 65 (G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright eds., Denis Paul & G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 1969).

[71] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations§23 (G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 1953).

[72] See, e.g., J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, Harvard University Press, 1962.

[73] See generally A. P. Martinich, Four Senses of “Meaning” in the History of Ideas: Quentin Skinner's Theory of Historical Interpretation, Journal of the Philosophy of History, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2009.

[74] See Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, in James Tully ed., Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics, Princeton University Press, 1988, pp. 43-56.

[75] See Quentin Skinner, A Reply to My Critics, in James Tully ed., Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics, Princeton University Press, 1988, pp. 278-281.

[76] 理查德·罗蒂（Richard Rorty）所著的《维特根斯坦和语言学转向》（Wittgensteinean and the Linguistic Turn）是对维特根斯坦之后关于这些主题的工作的最好概述。See Richard Rorty, Wittgenstein and the Linguistic Turn, in Philosophy As Culture Politics, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 176.

[77] Donald Davidson, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 17, 22.

[78] Donald Davidson, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 17, 22.

[79] “亲知知识”对应的原文为“knowledge by acquaintance”，意指通过实践即亲身而得的直接经验知识。——译者注

[80] “所予神话”对应的原文为“the Myth of the Given”。“所予”是指经验中直接给予意识即通过非推论的方式而获得的东西，“所予神话”是指此种哲学思维模式。塞拉斯对“所予神话”进行了批评。——译者注

[81] Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Harvard University Press, 1997, pp. 32-34 

[82] “片断”对应的原文为“episode”。塞拉斯唯名论论证的预言就基于对“片断”经验描述的过程。——译者注

[83] Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Harvard University Press, 1997, pp. 13-25.

[84] Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Harvard University Press, 1997, p. 76.

[85] Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Harvard University Press, 1997, p. 63.

[86] Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Harvard University Press, 1997, p. 76.

[87] Robert B. Brandom, Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism, Harvard University Press, 2000, p. 11. 关于布兰德姆的哲学如何增强思想史中的提示性观点，参见David L. Marshall, The Implications of Robert Brandom 's Inferentialism for Intellectual History, History and Theory, Vol. 52, No. 1, 2013.

[88] Robert B. Brandom, Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Harvard University Press, 1994, pp. 89-90.

[89] Robert B. Brandom, Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Harvard University Press, 1994, p. 90.

[90] Robert B. Brandom, Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Harvard University Press, 1994, p. 90.

[91] Richard Rorty, Wittgenstein and the Linguistic Turn, in Philosophy As Culture Politics, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 120, 123.

[92] See generally W. V. O. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in From a Logical Point of View: Logico-Philosophical Essays, Harvard University Press, 1953.

[93] Robert B. Brandom, Perspectives on Pragmatism: Classical, Recent, and Contemporary, Harvard University Press, 2011, p. 25.

[94] See generally Donald Davidson, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 125; W. V. O. Quine, Translation and Meaning, in Word and Object, The MIT Press, 1960.

[95] Donald Davidson, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 125.

[96] Donald Davidson, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. xviii-xx, 36.

[97] Donald Davidson, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. xviii-xx, 27.

[98] Donald Davidson, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 154.

[99] Donald Davidson, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 143.

[100] Donald Davidson, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 125.

[101] “剔除分析”对应的原文为“analysis is culled”

[102] 关于我自己试图提供这样的解释，参见Jonathan Gienapp, Making Constitutional Meaning: The Removal Debate and the Birth of Constitutional Essentialism, Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2015.

[103] 最好的例子仍然是Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution, Vintage, 1996.

[104] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations §31 (G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 1953).

[105] Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and History, pp. 12-13 (Aug. 29, 2014) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review)（鼓励使用这些方法）。

[106] 参见Quentin Skinner, “Social Meaning” and the Explanation of Social Action, in James Tully ed., Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics, Princeton University Press, 1988, 并且参见其附随文本。