美国前国务卿基辛格去世，享年100岁Henry Kissinger Is Dead at 100; Shaped U.S. Cold War History
NYtimes  DAVID E. SANGER2023年11月30日
基辛格，摄于1979年。他试图在危险而动荡的世界局势中实现并维持大国力量的平衡。 NEIL LEIFER/SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, VIA GETTY IMAGES
Henry A. Kissinger, the scholar-turned-diplomat who engineered the United States’ opening to China, negotiated its exit from Vietnam, and used cunning, ambition and intellect to remake American power relationships with the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War, sometimes trampling on democratic values to do so, died on Wednesday, according to a statement that was posted to his official website. He was 100.
根据其官方网站上发布的声明，亨利·基辛格于周三去世，享年100岁。这位学者出身的外交官策划了美国对中国的开放，是美国从越南撤出的谈判人，在“冷战”最激烈之时，凭借狡黠、野心和智慧重塑了美国与苏联的权力关系，有时不惜为此践踏民主价值。
He died at his home in Connecticut.
他在康涅狄格州的家中去世。
Few diplomats have been both celebrated and reviled with such passion as Mr. Kissinger. Considered the most powerful secretary of state in the post-World War II era, he was by turns hailed as an ultrarealist who reshaped diplomacy to reflect American interests and denounced as having abandoned American values, particularly in the arena of human rights, if he thought it served the nation’s purposes.
很少有外交官能像基辛格那样毁誉都如此强烈。他被认为是“二战”后权力最大的美国国务卿，时而被赞颂为一个为美国利益重塑外交政策的终极务实者，时而又被谴责在自认为有利于国家时会抛弃美国价值观，特别是在人权问题方面。
He advised 12 presidents — more than a quarter of those who have held the office — from John F. Kennedy to Joseph R. Biden Jr. With a scholar’s understanding of diplomatic history, a German-Jewish refugee’s drive to succeed in his adopted land, a deep well of insecurity and a lifelong Bavarian accent that sometimes added an indecipherable element to his pronouncements, he transformed almost every global relationship he touched.
从肯尼迪到拜登，他为12任总统——占到美国迄今所有总统的四分之一以上——担任过顾问。凭借对外交历史的深刻理解，加之作为德国犹太裔难民在第二故乡出人头地的动力、内心充满的不安全感，以及有时为其发言平添难解元素的终生难改的巴伐利亚乡音，基辛格改变了几乎一切有他参与的全球关系格局。
At a critical moment in American history and diplomacy, he was second in power only to President Richard M. Nixon. He joined the Nixon White House in January 1969 as national security adviser and, after his appointment as secretary of state in 1973, kept both titles, a rarity. When Nixon resigned, he stayed on under President Gerald R. Ford.
在美国历史和外交的一个关键期，他的权力仅次于总统尼克松。他于1969年1月进入尼克松政府担任国家安全顾问，并在1973年被委任国务卿之后罕见地保留了这两个头衔。尼克松辞职后，他继续在总统福特手下任职。
Mr. Kissinger’s secret negotiations with what was then still called Red China led to Nixon’s most famous foreign policy accomplishment. Intended as a decisive Cold War move to isolate the Soviet Union, it carved a pathway for the most complex relationship on the globe, between countries that at Mr. Kissinger’s death were the world’s largest (the United States) and second-largest economies, completely intertwined and yet constantly at odds as a new Cold War loomed.
基辛格与当时所谓“红色中国”的秘密谈判为尼克松最著名的外交政策成就奠定了基础。这一“冷战”时期的决定性举措目的是为了孤立苏联，它为全球最复杂的外交关系开辟了道路，到基辛格去世时，美中两国已是全球第一和第二大的经济体，它们在完全交织一处的同时，又在新“冷战”的阴影下龃龉不断。

1972年11月，时值越南战争期间，基辛格在纽约与尼克松总统会面，当时他刚从巴黎返回美国，在那里，他与北越代表黎德寿进行了秘密谈判。 ASSOCIATED PRESS
For decades he remained the country’s most important voice on managing China’s rise, and the economic, military and technological challenges it posed. He was the only American to deal with every Chinese leader from Mao to Xi Jinping. In May, at age 100, he met Mr. Xi and other Chinese leaders in Beijing, where he was treated like visiting royalty even as relations with Washington had turned adversarial.
几十年来，在美国应对中国崛起及其带来的经济、军事和技术挑战的问题上，基辛格始终是最重要的声音。他是唯一一位与从毛泽东到习近平的每一位中国领导人都打过交道的美国人。今年5月，年逾百岁的他在北京与习近平和其他中国领导人会面，尽管中美关系已转向敌对，但他仍受到了尊贵礼遇。
He drew the Soviet Union into a dialogue that became known as détente, leading to the first major nuclear arms control treaties between the two nations. With his shuttle diplomacy, he edged Moscow out of its standing as a major power in the Middle East, but failed to broker a broader peace in that region.
他说服苏联加入了后来被称为“缓和政策”的谈判，促成了两国第一项重大核武器限制条约的签署。通过穿梭外交，他让莫斯科在中东失去了主导地位，但还是未能促成该地区更广泛的和平。
Over years of meetings in Paris, he negotiated the peace accords that ended the American involvement in the Vietnam War, an achievement for which he shared the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize. He called it “peace with honor,” but the war proved far from over, and critics argued that he could have made the same deal years earlier, saving thousands of lives.
经过在巴黎的多年会谈，他促成了美国结束介入越南战争的和平协议，并因此同获1973年的诺贝尔和平奖。他称之为“光荣的和平”，但事实证明战争远未到终结之时，批评人士认为，他本可早几年达成同样的协议，挽救成千上万的生命。
Within two years, North Vietnam had overrun the American-backed South. It was a humiliating end to a conflict that from the beginning Mr. Kissinger had doubted the United States could ever win.
在不到两年时间里，北越就吞并了美国支持的南越。这是令美国蒙羞的结果，而基辛格从一开始就曾对美国能否赢得这场冲突提出了质疑。
To his detractors, the Communist victory was the inevitable conclusion of a cynical policy that had been intended to create some space between the American withdrawal from Vietnam and whatever came next. Indeed, in the margins of the notes for his secret trip to China in 1971, Mr. Kissinger scribbled, “We want a decent interval,” suggesting he simply sought to postpone the fall of Saigon.
在他的批评者看来，共产党的胜利是一种损人利己的政策的必然结果，该政策的目的是在美国从越南撤军后创造一些缓冲的空间，让局势不至于立刻急转。事实上，基辛格1971年秘密访华时曾在笔记空白处草草写道，“我们需要一个恰当的间歇期”，暗示他的目的不过是推迟西贡的陷落。
But by the time that interval was over, Americans had given up on the Vietnam project, no longer convinced that the United States’ strategic interests were linked to that country’s fate.
等到间歇期结束，美国人已经放弃了越南计划，不再相信美国的战略利益与越南的命运挂钩。

1973年1月，基辛格在巴黎与北越外交官黎德寿亮相。他们的谈判达成了美国在越南停火的协议，两人共同获得了1973年的诺贝尔和平奖。但黎德寿拒绝领奖。 ASSOCIATED PRESS
As was the case with Vietnam, history has judged some of his Cold War realism in a harsher light than it was generally portrayed at the time. With an eye fixed on great power rivalry, he was often willing to be crudely Machiavellian, especially when dealing with smaller nations that he often regarded as pawns in the greater battle.
正如越南发生的一切所揭示的那样，历史对基辛格“冷战”现实主义的评价比当时他得到的普遍描绘要更为严苛。由于着眼于大国竞争，他经常倾向于粗暴的马基雅维利主义，特别是在与小国打交道时，他总将这些国家视为更宏大斗争中的棋子。
He was the architect of the Nixon administration’s efforts to topple Chile’s democratically elected Socialist president, Salvador Allende.
他是尼克松政府推翻智利社会主义者、民选总统萨尔瓦多·阿连德的主谋。
He has been accused of breaking international law by authorizing the secret carpet-bombing of Cambodia in 1969-70, an undeclared war on an ostensibly neutral nation.
他被指控违反国际法，下令在1969年至1970年对柬埔寨秘密进行了地毯式轰炸，这是对一个表面中立国家的不宣而战。
His objective was to root out the pro-Communist Vietcong forces that were operating from bases across the border in Cambodia, but the bombing was indiscriminate: Mr. Kissinger told the military to strike “anything that flies or anything that moves.” At least 50,000 civilians were killed.
他的目的是铲除在柬埔寨边境的基地活动的越共军队，但轰炸本身是无差别攻击：基辛格告诉军方要打击“一切能飞能动的东西”。至少有5万平民被杀。
When Pakistan’s American-backed military was waging a genocidal war in East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, in 1971, he and Nixon not only ignored pleas from the American consulate in East Pakistan to stop the massacre, they approved weapons shipments to Pakistan, including the apparently illegal transfer of 10 fighter-bombers from Jordan.
1971年，当美国支持的巴基斯坦军队在东巴基斯坦（现在的孟加拉国）发动种族灭绝战争时，基辛格和尼克松不仅无视了美国驻东巴基斯坦领事馆停止屠杀的请求，还批准向巴基斯坦运送武器，其中包括转交约旦的10架战斗轰炸机这一显然违法的举动。
Mr. Kissinger and Nixon had other priorities: Supporting Pakistan’s president, who was serving as a conduit for Kissinger’s then-secret overtures to China. Again, the human cost was horrific: At least 300,000 people were killed in East Pakistan and 10 million refugees were driven into India.
基辛格和尼克松另有优先事项：支持巴基斯坦总统，让其成为基辛格当时向中国秘密示好的中间人。而这同样造成惨重伤亡：东巴基斯坦至少有30万人丧生，还有1000万难民被赶到印度。
In 1975, Mr. Kissinger and President Ford secretly approved the invasion of the former Portuguese colony of East Timor by Indonesia’s U.S.-backed military. After the loss of Vietnam, there were fears that East Timor’s leftist government could also go Communist.
1975年，基辛格和福特总统秘密批准让美国支持的印尼军队入侵前葡萄牙殖民地东帝汶。在输掉越战后，美国担心东帝汶的左派政府也将由共产党控制。
Mr. Kissinger told Indonesia’s president that the operation needed to succeed quickly and that “it would be better if it were done after we returned” to the United States, according to declassified documents from Mr. Ford’s presidential library. More than 100,000 East Timorese were killed or starved to death.
根据福特总统图书馆的解密文件，基辛格曾向印尼总统表示，行动必须迅速取得成功，并且“在我们回国之后进行会更好”。超过10万东帝汶人被杀或饿死。
Mr. Kissinger dismissed critics of these moves by saying that they did not face the world of bad choices he did. But his efforts to snuff out criticism with sarcastic one-liners only inflamed it.
基辛格对这些举措遭致的批评进行了反驳，称批评者并不像他那样需要面对无数糟糕选择。但他试图用嘲讽段子平息批评的努力适得其反。
“The illegal we do immediately,” he quipped more than once. “The unconstitutional takes a little longer.”
“做违法的事我们不假思索，”他不止一次打趣道。“做违宪的事要稍微考虑一下。”
On at least one potentially catastrophic stance Mr. Kissinger later reversed himself.
基辛格至少在一项可能造成灾难性后果的决策上扭转了原有的立场。
Starting in the mid-1950s as a young Harvard professor, he argued for the concept of limited nuclear war — a nuclear exchange that could be contained to a specific region. In office he worked extensively on nuclear deterrence — convincing an adversary, for instance, that there was no way to launch a nuclear strike without paying an unacceptably high price.
早在上世纪50年代中期还是一名年轻的哈佛大学教授的时候，他就提出了有限核战争的概念，即可以限制在特定区域的核交火。他在任职期间就核威慑问题投入了大量努力，例如让对手相信发动核打击必将付出不可接受的高昂代价。
But he later conceded that it might be impossible to prevent a limited nuclear war from escalating. By the end of his life he had embraced, with reservations, a new effort to gradually eliminate all nuclear weapons and, at age 95, he began to warn of the instability posed by the rise of weapons driven by artificial intelligence.
但他后来承认，阻止有限核战争的升级或许是不可能任务。晚年的他有保留地接受了一项逐步消除所有核武器的新努力，在95岁那年，他又开始对人工智能武器崛起所引发的动荡发出警告。
“All I can do in the few years left of me is to raise these issues,” he said in 2018. “I don’t pretend to have the answers.”
“在人生所剩无几的时间里，我能做的就是提出这些问题，”他在2018年说，“我不假装自己知道答案。”
Mr. Kissinger remained influential to the end. His latest writings on managing a rising China — including “On China” (2011), a 600-page book that mixed history with self-reverential anecdotes — could be found on the bookshelves of West Wing national security aides who followed him.
直到生命的最后，基辛格仍然保持了深远的影响力。在那些曾经追随他的国家安全助手的白宫西翼办公室书架上，仍能找到他关于应对中国崛起的最新著作，整整600页掺杂着自夸轶事的历史大作《论中国》（On China，2011年）。
Relevant Into His 90s
举足轻重的九旬老人
Fifty years after he joined the Nixon administration, Republican candidates still sought Mr. Kissinger’s endorsement and presidents sought his approval. Even Mr. Trump, after lambasting the Republican establishment, visited him during his 2016 campaign in the hope that the mere image of his seeking Mr. Kissinger’s advice would convey gravitas. (It yielded a New Yorker cartoon in which Mr. Kissinger is shown with a thought-bubble above his head reading, “I miss Nixon.”)
在进入尼克松政府任职的50年后，共和党候选人仍在寻求基辛格的支持，总统们也都争取他的认可。哪怕是特朗普也会在痛斥共和党建制派之后，于2016年竞选期间拜访他，期盼仅凭征询基辛格建议的姿态就能彰显自己是个正经人物。（这让《纽约客》创作了一幅漫画，画中基辛格头上的台词框里写着：“我想念尼克松”。）
Mr. Kissinger laughed about the fact that Mr. Trump could not name, when New York Times reporters asked, a single new idea or initiative that he had taken away from the meeting. “He’s not the first person I’ve advised who either didn’t understand what I was saying or didn’t want to,” he said. Still, once in office, Mr. Trump used him as a back channel to the Chinese leadership.
当《纽约时报》记者提及特朗普说不出他从此次会面汲取的任何新想法或举措时，基辛格对此一笑。“他不是第一个听不懂或不想听懂我在说什么的建议对象，”他说。尽管如此，特朗普在任内仍将基辛格视为与中国领导层接触的秘密渠道。

2017年5月，基辛格在白宫与特朗普总统会面。特朗普曾在2016年竞选期间拜访过他。 DOUG MILLS/THE NEW YORK TIMES
President Barack Obama, who was 8 years old when Mr. Kissinger first took office, was less enamored of him. Mr. Obama noted toward the end of his presidency that he had spent much of his tenure trying to repair the world that Mr. Kissinger left. He saw Mr. Kissinger’s failures as a cautionary tale.
奥巴马总统则没那么倚仗他，基辛格进入白宫任职时奥巴马年仅8岁。奥巴马在即将卸任总统时指出，他任内的大部分时间都在致力于修复基辛格留下的世界。他将基辛格的失败视作一种警示。
“We dropped more ordnance on Cambodia and Laos than on Europe in World War II,” Mr. Obama said in an interview with The Atlantic in 2016, “and yet, ultimately, Nixon withdrew, Kissinger went to Paris, and all we left behind was chaos, slaughter and authoritarian governments that finally, over time, have emerged from that hell.”
“我们在柬埔寨和老挝投下的炮弹比欧洲在‘二战’经历的炮火还要多，”奥巴马在2016年接受《大西洋月刊》的采访时说，“但到最后，尼克松撤军了，基辛格去了巴黎，留给世界的只有混乱、屠杀和随着时间推移终于从地狱里爬出来的专制政府。”
Mr. Obama noted that while in office he was still trying to help countries “remove bombs that are still blowing off the legs of little kids.”
奥巴马说，他在总统任内仍需努力帮助各国“拆除仍在炸断小孩双腿的炸弹”。
“In what way did that strategy promote our interests?” he said.
“这种战略怎么可能促进我国的利益呢？”他说。
Few figures in modern American history remained so relevant for so long as Mr. Kissinger. Well into his 90s he kept speaking and writing, and charging astronomical fees to clients seeking his geopolitical analysis.
美国现代史上很少有人物能像基辛格这样，在如此漫长的时间里保持着举足轻重的影响力。年近百岁的他仍在演讲和写作，并对向他咨询地缘政治分析的客户收取天价费用。
While the protesters at his talks dwindled, the very mention of his name could trigger bitter arguments. To his admirers, he was the brilliant architect of Pax Americana, the chess grandmaster who was willing to upend the board and inject a measure of unpredictability into American diplomacy.
虽然出现在他演讲现场的抗议者减少了，但只要他的名字出现，就可能引发激烈争论。在仰慕者看来，他是“美利坚治世”(Pax Americana)的杰出设计师，是愿意颠覆棋局并为美国外交注入某种不可预测性的运筹高手。
To his detractors — and even some friends and former employees — he was vain, conspiratorial, arrogant and short-tempered, a man capable of praising a top aide as indispensable while ordering the F.B.I. to illegally tap his home phones to see if he was leaking to the press.
对他的批评者，甚至还有一些友人和前雇员来说，他虚荣、阴险、傲慢且暴躁，能在赞美某位高级助手不可或缺的同时，反手就命令联邦调查局非法窃听此人的住宅电话，看他是否向媒体泄露了信息。
The irony was not lost on two generations of reporters, who knew that if they were looking for leaks — usually self-interested ones — Mr. Kissinger, a master of the art, was a ready source. “If anybody leaks in this administration, I will be the one to leak,” he said. And he did, prodigiously.
具有讽刺意味的是，两代记者都知道，如果他们想要寻找泄密者——通常是为了自身利益而泄密——基辛格这位泄密艺术的大师正是一个现成的来源。“如果本届政府中有人泄密，那就是我，”他说。他正是这样做的，而且泄密非常多。
To read Mr. Kissinger’s laudatory 1957 book analyzing the world order created by Prince Clemens von Metternich of Austria, who led the Austrian empire in the post-Napoleonic era, is also to read something of a self-description, particularly when it came to the ability of a single leader to bend nations to his will.
基辛格在1957年写了一本充满赞美之词的书，分析了奥地利亲王克莱门斯·冯·梅特涅在后拿破仑时代领导奥地利帝国所创造的世界秩序，这本书某种程度上也是他的自我描述，尤其是在谈到一位领导人让各国服从自己意志的能力时。
“He excelled at manipulation, not construction,” Mr. Kissinger said of Metternich. “He preferred the subtle maneuver to the frontal attack.”
“他擅长操纵，而不是构建，”基辛格这样评价梅特涅。“比起正面攻击，他更喜欢巧妙的策略。”
That style was demonstrated during the Nixon years as the Watergate scandal unfolded. Increasingly isolated, Nixon often turned to Mr. Kissinger, the undiminished star of his administration, for reassurance and a recitation of his greatest achievements.
这种风格在尼克松时代的水门事件中得到了体现。日益孤立无援的尼克松经常向基辛格——这位他政府中永不褪色的明星——寻求安慰，并让他讲述自己最伟大的成就。
He would oblige. The Watergate tapes revealed Mr. Kissinger spending humiliating hours listening to the president’s harangues, including antisemitic comments delivered to his Jewish secretary of state. Mr. Kissinger often responded with flattery. After returning to his office, he would roll his eyes as he told his closest colleagues about Nixon’s bizarre behavior.
基辛格乐于效劳。水门事件录音带显示，基辛格好几个小时聆听总统的长篇大论，其中包括后者对这位犹太国务卿发表的反犹言论，这让基辛格感到丢脸。基辛格经常以奉承回应总统的话，然而回到办公室后，他向最亲密的同事讲述尼克松的奇怪行为时会翻白眼。
Leaks and Paranoia
泄密和偏执
Mr. Kissinger was not involved in the Watergate affair. Yet the break-in at the offices of the Democratic National Committee by a White House team of burglars and the administration’s attempts to cover up the crime emerged from a culture of suspicion and secretiveness that many argue that he helped foster.
基辛格没有卷入水门事件。然而，白宫窃贼闯入民主党全国委员会办公室，以及政府试图掩盖罪行的行为，都源于一种怀疑和保密的文化，许多人认为，基辛格在这种文化的形成中起到了作用。
In the spring of 1969, soon after taking office, he was so enraged by the leaks behind a Times report of the Cambodia bombing campaign that he ordered the F.B.I. to tap the phones of more than a dozen White House aides, including members of his own staff. The recordings never turned up a culprit.
1969年春，上任后不久，他对时报一篇关于柬埔寨轰炸行动报道背后的泄密事件感到非常愤怒，下令联邦调查局窃听十几名白宫助手的电话，其中包括他自己的工作人员。录音中没有发现元凶。
He was similarly infuriated by the publication of the Pentagon Papers in The Times and The Washington Post in 1971. The classified documents chronicled the government’s war policies and planning in Vietnam, and leaking them, in his view, jeopardized his secret face-to-face diplomacy. His complaints helped inspire the creation of the White House burglary team, the leak-plugging Plumbers unit that would later break into Democratic headquarters at the Watergate building.
1971年，《纽约时报》和《华盛顿邮报》公布了五角大楼文件，这同样让他感到愤怒。这些机密文件记录了政府在越南的战争政策和计划，在他看来，泄露这些文件危及了他那些面对面的秘密外交。他的不满促使白宫组建了私闯小组，也就是后来进入水门大厦民主党总部的那个负责封堵泄密消息的“管道工”小组。

 NEWSWEEK 1974
In August 1974, as Nixon reconciled himself to the choice between impeachment and resignation, he drew Mr. Kissinger into one of the most operatic moments in White House history. Having told Mr. Kissinger that he intended to resign, a distraught Nixon asked his secretary of state to kneel with him in silent prayer outside the Lincoln Sitting Room.
1974年8月，正在接受弹劾和辞职之间举棋不定的尼克松把基辛格拉进了白宫历史上最戏剧化的时刻之一。在告诉基辛格他打算辞职后，心急如焚的尼克松要求他的国务卿和他一起跪在林肯会客厅外默祷。
Yet, as Nixon sank deeper into Watergate, Mr. Kissinger attained a global prominence few of his successors have matched.
然而，随着尼克松在水门事件中陷得更深，基辛格获得了他的继任者很少能匹敌的全球声望。
Aides described his insights as brilliant and his temper ferocious. They told stories of Mr. Kissinger throwing books across his office in towering rages, and of a manipulative streak that led even his most devoted associates to distrust him.
助手们形容他的洞察力过人，脾气暴躁。他们讲述基辛格盛怒之下把书从办公室一头扔过来的故事，还有他的控制欲，这甚至导致他最忠实的同事也不信任他。
“In dealing with other people he would forge alliances and conspiratorial bonds by manipulating their antagonisms,” Walter Isaacson wrote in his comprehensive 1992 biography, “Kissinger,” a book its subject despised.
沃尔特·艾萨克森在1992年出版的传记《基辛格》(Kissinger)中写道，“在与他人打交道时，他会通过操纵他们的敌对情绪来建立联盟和阴谋关系。”

1971年访问北京期间，基辛格与助手温斯顿·洛德在起草公报途中消遣了一番。 WHITE HOUSE PHOTO OFFICE COLLECTION
“Drawn to his adversaries with a compulsive attraction, he would seek their approval through flattery, cajolery and playing them off against others,” Mr. Isaacson observed. “He was particularly comfortable dealing with powerful men whose minds he could engage. As a child of the Holocaust and a scholar of Napoleonic-era statecraft, he sensed that great men as well as great forces were what shaped the world, and he knew that personality and policy could never be fully divorced. Secrecy came naturally to him as a tool of control. And he had an instinctive feel for power relationships and balances, both psychological and geostrategic.”
“他的对手对他有一种强迫性的吸引力，他会通过奉承、哄骗和挑拨对手来获得他们的认可，”艾萨克森观察到。“他特别擅长与有权势的人打交道，因为他可以调动这些人的思想。作为纳粹大屠杀受害者的后代和研究拿破仑时代治国方略的学者，他深知伟人和强大的力量才是塑造世界的关键，他也知道，人格和政策永远不可能完全分离。他很自然地把秘密作为一种控制手段。他对权力关系和平衡有着本能的感觉，无论是心理上的还是地缘战略上的。”
In old age, when the hard edges had been filed down and old rivalries had receded or been buried along with his former adversaries, Mr. Kissinger would sometimes talk about the comparative dangers of the global order he had shaped and a far more disorderly world facing his successors.
到了晚年，当他强硬的棱角已被磨平，旧日的竞争已经消退，或与他昔日的对手一起被埋葬，基辛格有时会谈论他所塑造的全球秩序的相对危险性，以及他的继任者面临的一个更加混乱的世界。
There was something fundamentally simple, if terrifying, in the superpower conflicts he navigated; he never had to deal with terrorist groups like Al Qaeda or the Islamic State, or a world in which nations use social media to manipulate public opinion and cyberattacks to undermine power grids and communications.
他所驾驭的超级大国之间的冲突从根本上说是简单的，虽然非常可怕；他从来没有处理过基地组织或伊斯兰国这样的恐怖组织，也没有处理过各国利用社交媒体操纵公众舆论、利用网络攻击破坏电网和通信的世界。
“The Cold War was more dangerous,” Mr. Kissinger said in a 2016 appearance at the New-York Historical Society. “Both sides were willing to go to general nuclear war.” But, he added, “today is more complex.”
“冷战更加危险，”2016年，基辛格在纽约历史学会露面时说。“双方都不惜发动一场全面核战争。”但是，他补充说，“今天的情况更加复杂。”
The great-power conflict had changed dramatically from the cold peace he had tried to engineer. No longer ideological, it was purely about power. And what worried him most, he said, was the prospect of conflict with “the rising power” of China as it challenged the might of the United States.
与他试图策划的冷和平相比，大国冲突已发生了巨大变化。它不再关乎意识形态，而是纯粹关乎权力。他说，最让他担心的是与“崛起的大国”中国发生冲突的前景，因为中国正在挑战美国的实力。
Russia, in contrast, was “a diminished state,” and no longer “capable of achieving world domination,” he said in a 2016 Times interview in Kent, Conn., where he kept a second home.
相比之下，俄罗斯是“一个衰落的国家”，不再“有能力统治世界”，2016年他在康涅狄格州肯特接受时报采访时说。他在那里拥有第二个居所。
Yet he warned against underestimating Vladimir V. Putin, the Russian leader. Making reference to Hitler’s autobiographical manifesto, he said: “In order to understand Putin, one has to read Dostoyevsky, not ‘Mein Kampf.’ He believes Russia was cheated, that we keep taking advantage of it.”
然而，他警告不要低估俄罗斯领导人普京。他在谈及希特勒那部自传式宣言时说：“要想理解普京，人们必须读陀思妥耶夫斯基，而不是《我的奋斗》。他认为俄罗斯被骗了，而我们一直在占俄罗斯的便宜。”
Mr. Kissinger took some satisfaction in the fact that Russia was a lesser threat. After all, he had concluded the first strategic arms agreement with Moscow and steered the United States toward accepting the Helsinki Accords, the 1975 compact on European security that obtained some rights of expression for Soviet bloc dissidents. In retrospect, it was one of the droplets that turned into the river that swept away Soviet Communism.
俄罗斯的威胁减小，对基辛格来说会有些成就感。毕竟，是他与莫斯科签署了第一份战略武器协议，并引导美国接受了1975年签署的《赫尔辛基协议》，这是一份关于欧洲安全的协议，为苏联集团的异见人士获得了一些表达权利。回想起来，这是一颗水滴，众多这样的水滴汇聚起来，成为冲垮苏联共产主义的江河。
Man About Town
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翻译：纽约时报中文网